Effects of Russian “Re-set” Button on U.S. – Ukraine Relations

22 липня 2010

Policy Analysis

Ukrainian Congress Committee of America

Analysis

On June 24, 2010, during Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s working visit to the United States, President Barack Obama declared that the “re-set” of relations with Russia has been successfully accomplished.   This “re-set” was the result of President Obama’s desire to repair the relationship that most believed had seriously deteriorated during George W. Bush’s terms in office.   Since the term was coined in February 2009, political analysts have been discussing if it will actually change relations between the two countries, and if so, what types of changes will possibly be made.  One of the topics that has yet to be widely discussed; however, is the effect the “re-set” button has had on Russia’s neighbors in Central and East Europe, in particular, Ukraine.  The rationale for the Obama Administration was the opportunity for this new Russia-policy to provide a ripple-effect on positive changes in regards to Ukraine, but de facto, it has produced many negative effects on the country.

“Re-set” was touted as a means to an ends – producing better relations with Russia would ultimately enhance Russia’s relations with its neighbors.   This theoretical, optimistic outlook has unfortunately been personified under the current Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych.   Since his election in February 2010, in which he was backed by Russian leaders, his regime has made many attempts to distance itself from the largely Western – friendly foreign policy of his predecessors, President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.   Yanukovych has increased the country’s ties to Russia, and has attempted to appease President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin politically, militarily, and economically. 

Because of the close ties that Ukraine currently has with Russia, is it truly possible that an improvement in ties between Russia and the United States will in turn open - up Ukraine and allow it to have better relations with the U.S.?  Recent high-level Obama Administration visits to Ukraine seem to placate the notion of a strategic partnership between the two countries, which was established in December 2008.   What some may see as a possible beginning of this process could already be seen during Secretary Clinton’s recently concluded visit to Ukraine in July 2010.  On the topic of economics, the Secretary stated that during the second meeting of the United States-Ukraine Strategic Partnership Commission, she and Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko had discussed expanding bilateral trade between the nations, “Both sides recognized the potential for increased bilateral trade and investment and, in that regard, agreed on the need for renewed efforts to improve the business and investment climate and to tackle corruption.”[1]  On the topic of global security, the two discussed the agreements that had already been made by Presidents Obama and Yanukovych at the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010 in Washington, DC, in which Ukraine agreed to dispose of its highly enriched uranium before the security summit’s next meeting in 2012.

Yet, a known detriment as a result of the “re-set” button is Ukraine’s potential entrance to Euro-Atlantic institutions, in particular, NATO.  Both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko had expressed interest in joining the alliance during their time in office, and Yushchenko had taken the first step toward entering the alliance by applying for a membership action plan (MAP) in 2008.  However, President Yanukovych’s regime has taken a different direction in this realm.  The current President’s known apathy towards NATO originates to his earlier years in the Ukrainian government, where in 2006 he firmly declared:  “we [Ukraine] should be a reliable bridge between the European Union and Russia."[2]

But rather than emphasize the Bucharest NATO Summit communiqué in April 2008, which clearly denoted the organization’s intent of having Ukraine and Georgia eventually in the Alliance, Secretary Clinton acknowledged Ukraine’s current political leaning during her recent visit, stating: “We believe that it is up to Ukrainians to chart your own course towards your own future.”[3] 

The Ukrainian government’s decision was one that was much to the delight of Russia, because President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin are opposed to Ukraine (and Georgia) entering the Alliance because of strategic reasons.  They view NATO as a threat to Russia’s borders and an infringement upon the area that they believe to be their “sphere of influence.”  In fact, a foreign policy statement issued before Medevdev took office in 2008 indicates Russia’s desire to reverse their setbacks of the past two decades and reassert its influence in it’s “near abroad.”  Russia has become an active player - economically, politically, and militarily - on the European stage.

Yet, while experts testify and opine over Ukraine’s perspective in a new realm of U.S.-Russian relations, it remains clear that Russian influence in Ukraine is substantial.  Many experts fail to realize the impact of Russia upon Ukrainian issues, as evidenced by the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) in Ukrainian waters.  What Russia cannot gain through threats or force it has acquired by economic pressure through its giant state-owned Gazprom conglomerate.  Russia has exploited Ukraine’s economic predicament and lack of energy diversification to acquire several key concessions – the extension of the lease of the Russian BSF in Crimea until the year 2042 for cheaper gas prices for Ukraine; and, Russia has acquired permission to re-establish the presence of its security forces (the FSB) in Crimea. The mere physical presence of the Russian navy on Ukraine’s territory, and now its security service, ties directly into the promotion of Russian culture and language in the country.  It is clear that Russian leaders, who often bemoan the collapse of the Soviet Union as ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,’ yearn to restore Russian influence and control over the old “near abroad”, in particular Ukraine. 

Recommendations

There have been many suggestions made as to how the Obama Administration should approach Ukraine after the “re-set.”  David Kramer, a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund and former State Department official, recently commented in The Washington Post on the impact that engagement can have with the Ukrainians.  Issues such as media and religious/non-governmental organizations censorship, as well as combating corruption rank high on Kramer’s list of policy priorities for U.S. engagement in Ukraine, all the while acknowledging that the promotion of Russian culture by Ukraine’s new government “only contributes to the country’s polarization.”

The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA), the representative organization of the over 1 million Americans of Ukrainian descent, supports the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine.  As Americans, we believe that a democratic and independent Ukraine is in the national security interests of the United States and consistent with our traditions of support for individual freedom and self-determination.

The U.S. must not acquiesce to those in Russia who view the “near abroad” as subjects of Russia’s sphere of influence. The Obama Administration needs more resources and active participation in dealing with Central and East European countries, in particular Ukraine.  Thus, the (UCCA) recommends the following policy considerations:

• The Charter on Strategic Partnership between Ukraine and the United States calls for the establishment of an American Presence Post (APP) in Crimea to interact and develop programs with the indigenous Crimean Tatars and ethnic minority Ukrainian population on the peninsula.
• Even as NATO considers Ukraine its most active partner since the country participates in all operations led by the Alliance (Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan), the Obama Administration should forthrightly promote continuous civic education programs to enlighten Ukrainians about NATO, as well as to assist Ukraine in their efforts to meet the standards of the Annual National Program.  
• Former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, Carlos Pascual, during his tenure in Ukraine consistently reiterated the notion that ‘Ukraine is a European country…Ukrainians are Europeans.’ The Obama Administration can adhere to this adage in the promotion of the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the United States by providing more opportunities for cultural, educational, and professional exchange groups to visit the United States.  
• The addition of a political dialogue working group within the framework of the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership Commission will be vitally important to continue a dialogue not only with U.S. and Ukrainian government officials, but also with civil society groups inherently dedicated to the promotion of democratic institutions in Ukraine.

[1] Joint Statement of the Second Session of the United States-Ukraine. 2 July 2010.

[2] Finn, Peter. "Ukraine's Yanukovych Halts NATO Entry Talks." The Washington Post. 15 Sept. 2006.

[3] Bimbaum, Benjamin. "Clinton: NATO Doors Remain Open for Ukraine." Washington Times. 2 July 2010. Web. 15 July 2010.